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The Signs of the Time: With or Without Post-Modernism?
Theodor Damian
This essay starts from Charles Taylor's idea about the world's self possession, and analyzes
childhood and maturity as two distinct phases in the history of our civilization. He
embraces this idea in order to propose the periodization of this history not into three
sections—i.e., pre-modernism, modernism, and post-modernism—but only into two—premodernism and modernism. The argument is biblical. The essay takes as the point of
departure the Pauline expression "the fulfillment of time" (Galatians 4, 4) and the parable
of the prodigal son.
Commenting on the new book by Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Wilfred M. McClay spoke
of the need of a mature humanity that would eventually have evolved into the phase of selfpossession (“Uncomfortable Unbelief” in First Things, Nr. 183, May 2008, p. 35). In other
words, the state of self-possession would indicate the coming of age of humankind.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer already declared in his time that humankind had reached adulthood.1
If by “adulthood” we understand the term to mean the entering into maturity, then the
Hitlerist and Communist holocausts would have some kind of explanation: When you
become adult, in a sense, you are just coming out of the phase of terribilism that precedes
adulthood and whose reminiscences can still be found in the new phase.
On the other hand, adulthood does not mean complete maturity. In this case the following
question arises: If humankind needed so many millennia to come of age, how many more
millennia will adulthood last, and then, after becoming mature, how many millennia would
characterize the old-age phase? Evidently, still another question arises here as well: In how
many millennia would humankind die, and how could one imagine a death that would last
millennia?
If we understand Bonheoffer’s expression in the sense of maturity, then the question about
the two holocausts and other catastrophes of the last century is posed with more stringency.
It would be interesting to have a debate on this issue in the context of the definitions given
to modernism and post-modernism and in the context of the periodization of our recent
history.
I do not subscribe to what I consider the artificial distinction between modern/modernism,
on the one hand, and post-modern/post-modernism on the other hand. Yet if postmodernism, as an epoch which is apparently our time now, is understood as a recuperation
of pre-modern values and a new understanding, interpretation and application of them (as

1

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (New Greatly Enlarged Edition), Collier Books,
McMillan, New York, p. 341.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016

1

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 74 [2016], No. 74, Art. 5

Comparative Civilizations Review

61

Constantin V. Negoita, for example, writes2), then this means that humanity already long
ago reached maturity and that modernism represented only an “exit from the natural,” from
the normal, from a way of being. Consequently then, post-modernism would mean a
coming back to normal.
Following André Malraux, Negoita is right when he considers the recuperation of religious
values as the most important sign of the coming back to the pre-modern, evidently in a
different context from several and essential points of view: epistemological, experiential,
hermeneutic, etc. This discussion framework seems fit to allow me to propose an alltogether new theory and a serious reflection topic regarding periodizations and definitions
of the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern categories.
The theory starts from two key elements, both biblical, and which, if combined, shed a new
light on the history of humanity in its pre-modern and modern periods. These elements are:
the Pauline expression (“the fulfillment of time”) and the parable of the prodigal son, much
endeared by philosopher Constantin Noica.3
The expression “the fulfillment of time” (Galatians 4, 4) has received many different
interpretations. I propose here the following one: Jesus Christ came into the world at the
fulfillment of time, that is to say when humanity was no longer in its phase of childhood.
Nor was humanity in the phase of adolescence, but at least in the one of adulthood, if not,
even better, that of maturity, a phase in which the world was capable of understanding the
divine teaching revealed by Him.
The Fathers of the Church, Irenaeus of Lugdunum amongst them, considered that at the
time of the primordial fall, man was in the state of childhood; that is why obedience was
an imperative, and an absolutely vital issue. In this case, the entire time until Jesus Christ’s
coming into the world was a time of childhood, young adulthood, a time of growth, of
preparation for the great event that was going to happen: the incarnation of the Divine
Logos in history.
Just as in some traditions, cultural and/or religious, coming into adulthood is an event
marked by the ritual of passage for which a long preparation is necessary, and that is
awaited impatiently by both the subjects of the ritual and those around them; the same thing
happens at the fulfillment of time. This was the moment when, after the waiting and
preparation that took place in advance, something new happened. It happened just because
the time was right (kairos).
Thus the incarnation of the Divine Logos in history represents a passage ritual of
humanity—humanity’s stepping from one phase into the other. Logically speaking, if
2
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humanity would not have reached the necessary stage when it was able to understand the
culminant revelations of God in Christ, this coming would have happened at a later time.
Ewert Cousins calls this period of Jesus’ coming, including the five centuries that preceded
it (which I consider to have been the passage ritual for humanity), the second great axial
period of human civilization.4 In this case, humanity reached adulthood not when Dietrich
Bonhoeffer said, but it happened when Paul spoke of the “fulfillment of time.”
It is from this time on, from Christ's coming into the world, that one can speak of premodernism, according to some periodizations. As any historical period and as any period
in human life, it has its own incrementa atque decrementa (growth and decay).
Now I am moving on to the second key element of my new theory: the parable of the
prodigal son.
Right from the beginning one has to specify that in the biblical sense, the prodigal son
represents not only a person but also the whole world. Consequently the type of relations
and their evolution in the story refer not only to the personal relation of the human subject
to God, but also to the relation between the world and God.
The problem of the prodigal son is that he had a phase of errance, of estrangement, while
everything was okay with him both before the departure and after the return. The phase of
errance has to be seen as a deviation from the normal, natural, regular order of things. That
is the reason why, when he was in the ultimate depth of suffering in his errance, we are
told that “he came back into himself,” into who he used to be, into the regular order of
being. This period of errance, I propose, corresponds to what is generally called the
modern phase in human history, which means the period that begins with the French
Revolution and lasts until the time of the fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
Just as the prodigal son suddenly abandoned the traditional values of his family and of his
own history, so Enlightenment, Darwinism, Marxism and other movements, philosophies
and mentalities tried with sustained effort to throw away the traditional values of their own
history, the one in which they had appeared, starting with the most important of them all,
religion, which they targeted throughout this time. Yet, the intense process of
secularization that those movements initiated is small and short compared with the time
that preceded it, just as in the case of the prodigal son, the time of estrangement was shorter
that the one spent in the normal order of things in his father’s home.
It is noteworthy to remark that what brought the son back to normal was the suffering he
experienced in the ultimate level of human misery, a direct consequence of having
abandoned his father’s home, of having separated himself from his own history. By the
4
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same token, our modern secularized history is one which through two holocausts—Hitlerist
and Communist—experienced the ultimate level of human degradation, inflicting the
deepest suffering possible to imagine upon human society. Yet it is exactly this suffering
that represents the point of departure for the son’s return back to normal, as if from hell he
is coming back onto the earth, as if the experience of death brings him to resurrection.
Likewise, in the case of modernism, the two great sufferings became themselves the points
of departure for a new type of conscientization, which led to the coming back to normal or
to the coming into the self (the authentic self which was deserted), which means the coming
to resurrection.
Now one might ask the question: if post-modernism is a return to pre-modernism, which is
a reprise of the old existential line over the accidental abyss of the time of errance, do we
still have to divide history into three periods, or is it sufficient to divide it only into two:
“pre-modern”—until the second great axial epoch, which culminates with the incarnation
of the Divine Logos in History—and “modern”—from Jesus Christ to the present time?
If we consider the fact that Christ came into the world at the fulfillment of time, when
humanity reached its maturity phase, and if at the present time we have not yet entered the
phase of death, extinction, but are still in the phase of maturity, which—based on the human
paradigm—is the longest one, then we can justifiably agree that we are finding ourselves
in the period of modernism in this new understanding.
Some philosophers, on the other hand, speak of the present time as being “post-human.” If
we accept this idea, it implies that we are finding ourselves in the final phase of the history
of humankind, and thus, indeed in a third and last period. But what does “post-human”
mean? If the expression refers to the abolition of the human and its replacement with the
machine, as N. Berdiaev observed,5 then we are facing a certain state of things. Yet the
question still remains: what is the maximal point of this abolition, what exactly does it
consist of, and how do we know that we are there?
If the expression refers to the “human” only, in the sense of what happens strictly in human
interpersonal relations, then we are faced with a different state of things. The machine can
be imagined as replacing the human, but that does not necessarily mean that man will
become a beast to his or her fellow man, a sort of homo homini lupus.
Ideally, man should be a homo hominis Deus (man being a god to man) or at least a homo
hominis homo (man being a man to man) for those around him. American philosopher
Abraham Heschel wrote that what makes man a human being is not the being but the being

5
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human.6 Something similar is mentioned by a Romanian proverb: "To be great is no
wonder, to be truly human is the big achievement."
Thus if we are finding ourselves in the third phase, the final one of the history of
humankind, that of death, it is not clear yet.
We need clearer criteria in order to be able to read “the signs of the time.” If we think of
André Malraux’s prophecy regarding the state of religion in the twenty-first century ("The
twenty-first century will be religious or it will not be"), if we notice that religion did not
disappear and that the world is still in place and if, on the contrary, we are correct in noticing
a recuperation of religious values, an already evident return to religion, even at this
beginning of the twenty-first century, one would have reason to believe and to hope that
humanity is not (yet) on its death bed.
Coming back to Wilfred M. McClay’s declaration that a mature humanity can possess itself,
as if this feat is something positive, a big question mark arises: what exactly would
humankind in a state of self-possession mean?
Of course, one connotation of the expression refers to the independence characteristic of
the age of maturity. Children are dependent. They do not possess themselves. It is others
who possess them. Yet, when one is old, it is the same. The Scripture says: “When you
will be old, someone else will put the belt on you and will take you where you do not want”
(John 21, 18). Thus, maturity, through its specific independence, leads to self-possession.
You are in control of yourself, of your own destiny.
Yet if we place this idea in a theological context, in the context of religious values
mentioned above, the expression takes on a negative connotation. When we say
“independence,” what do we mean? Independence from what? Of man from man? That is
not possible. Man is “condemned” to communion, to inter-dependence. "No man is an
island," the proverb says. Man is created in God’s image, the tri-une God, Christian
theology says.
Man’s independence from man would lead to the drama of the prodigal son who,
considering that he had become adult and mature and that he had the right to ask for his
part of the family possessions, asks for it and gets it, probably just because he had become
mature. What followed after that is well-known.
Man’s independence from man also leads to the drama of individualism generated by the
philosophies of the Enlightenment. It is this type of individualism that, according to Robert
Bellah and his colleagues, is at the root of all major crises of the twentieth century.7
6
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If we move from the idea of man’s independence from man to that of man’s independence
from God, the consequence is not at all better. If the prodigal son’s father from the parable
is God, and this is the sense in which the story was told, and if the prodigal son is the world,
then man’s distancing from God, his independence at this level, leads implicitly to the
drama told in the parable.
Thus, if we are referring to the modern period with the Enlightenment and all the other
secularizing movements that characterized it, if we have in view the individualism and the
other consequences of the anthropocentric philosophies that eliminated God from man’s
life, the ensuing drama is the same as in the case of man’s independence from man, if not
worse. What followed are catastrophic tragedies, as those of the two aforementioned
holocausts.
In both cases, God was thrown out of history and man took His place. In Nietzschean
terms, God is dead and He was killed by man. Man, this incorrigible usurper, selfproclaimed destructor, as Cioran calls him,8 takes God’s place, but soon, in that place which
is not his, he finds himself inadequate, and it is from here that starts his suffering that ends
in suicide.
Let me go back to the previous question: independence from what or from whom? Isn’t this
type of independence exactly the opposite: not a sign of maturity but of immaturity?
Would not the idea of human freedom conjugated with human inter-dependency and with
dependency on God, as Christian theology promotes, be the best and true solution to this
impasse?
In terms of self-possession, the fundamental question arises: Is it good that man possesses
himself? As Erich Fromm writes, whatever man possesses man destroys.9 Cioran calls man
a self-proclaimed destructor. This is the sense in which Karl Barth wrote that before God
man cannot but die.10
The idea that man destroys what he possesses is present in the story of the prodigal son
also: “Father give me my part of all possessions.” He wanted to be sure of being the sole
possessor of them, and he destroyed them, destroying himself.
The same thing, yet in a different form, happened in Hitlerism and Marxism: man believed
he had the right to possess others and trampled them under his feet, destroying their dignity,
the human condition itself.
8
Emile Cioran, The Fall into Time, transl. from French by Richard Howard, Quadrangle Books, Chicago,
1970, p. 42.
9
Erich Fromm, To Have or to Be, cf. Theodor Damian, Theological and Spiritual Dimensions of Icons
according to St. Theodore of Studion, The Edwin Mellen Press, New York, 2002, p. 3.
10
Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man. transl. by Douglas Horton, Harper and Brothers,
New York, 1957, p. 140.
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If the twenty-first century will be religious, then the maturity of humankind will not be
characterized by self-possession. Rather, man will accept and follow the existential
Trinitarian paradigm in as much as possible at a human level, and follow the paradigm of
an existence put in the service of others with love and respect as offered by the divine Logos
incarnated in history.
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